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# FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

5-2127

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

Honorable Allen W. Dulles Director, Central Intelligence Agency Washington 25, D. C.

Dear M

I readily understand how a verbatim intelligence appraisal, regardless of editing, may not be suitable for public dissemination. For this reason I am returning your Mayors' Conference manuscript.

However, a resume with classified matter deleted -- as you suggest -- will be appreciated. We are most anxious to get all of the Conference speeches, or resumes, in the hands of the printer as soon as possible. The demand from mayors for this material is brisk because of their inability to determine what should, and should not, be reported to their people.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

\$incerely

Val Peterson

Enclosure

On file OSD release instructions apply.

FEMA review(s) completed.

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MR. DULIES: I have asked Gov. Peterson's permission to reverse him on one point. I welcome questions. If I can't or shouldn't answer them, I will let you know very frankly. While I only have 20 minutes to address you, I will try to cut off at least three or four of the minutes at the end so if there are any questions you can put them to me. I may be seeing some of you this afternoon at the White House, and we can get together there, possibly, if there are any more.

The job of the Central Intelligence Agency is to try to ferret out facts and present those facts to the policymakers of Government. It is not our job to say what should be done with the facts. It is merely our job—and that is a hard enough one—to try to find out what the facts are.

When you are dealing with Russia, sometimes the best you can do is to come up with an educated guess, based on inadequate facts, and an estimate of what they have done in the past.

In that connection—and this is more from the point of view of your particular functions as Mayors of our great cities—the Soviets are able to learn a great deal more about us than we are about them. We publish the essential facts of our situation to the world. We tell the world where our installations are, where we are making this and that. We give them a great deal of information. In fact, I think we give them probably too much, but it is a very difficult problem. When you have to decide between the maintenance of our freedoms, our freedom of the press and our other freedoms, and possibly disclosing more information than an intelligence officer would like to see disclosed, I can quite uncerstance that we our freedoms are much more important. If we start to abring them in any respect, it is hard to tell where we will end.

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To turn briefly to the position of the Soviet Union as we see it.

When Stalin died, early last spring, a change came about in the Soviet

Union; but that change, in our opinion, has not affected its basic foreign

policy. The change was largely internal. We had not realized—and not

until Stalin's death did we realize—the extent to which that old dicta
tor had really taken hold of the country and of all the people, there and

forced it into a pattern that was not a pattern that the other leaders that the Kremlin liked. When Stalin was buried, he was really buried and

one of the extraordinary things is the extent to which his successors

have buried his memory. There has been very little mention of Stalin.

The Lenin line has been disinterred and brought out again; the Stalin

line has been pretty well interred.

and the framework is still rigid enough. He had set so rigid a framework that the people themselves were beginning to feel impatient. He had frozen their foreign policies into a rigidity be even men like Molotov did not like. They blamed Stalin for the break with Yugoslavia. They probably blamed Stalin pretty largely for the war in Korea and for many other rigid actions in foreign policy. So when he disappeared, they decided to change certain features of their system. That does not mean, as I said before, that they have relaxed to any great extent. They have, however, in agriculture taken a new look at the situation. They have clamped certain restrictions on the internal police. Beria's dismissal and execution is undoubtedly due to the fact that they wanted to curb the secret police. They more or less put a sign up: "Don't walk on the

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grass; but if you walk on the path, we won't worry you so much. In the other days, you never could tell—you might be walking on the path and still you find yourself in jail.

They also found apparently that they weren't giving their people enough from the point of view of consumer's goods, and they are making a real effort now to give them more. One of the interesting things that we have to watch is as to what extent, if at all, that will force them to cut down on their production of munitions and war material. So far we have seen very little sign of reduction. They have been using recently quite a little of their gold to buy consumer's goods in the foreign market. You may have seen in the papers reports of sale of Soviet gold. That is going on; the gold sales of the last three or four months have gone up quite spectacularly, largely, we think, so that Russia can buy consumer's goods in the market.

We believe that the military now exercise greater authority in the Soviet Union than they did before Stalin's death. It is hard to prove that, but the execution of Beria, who was the artisan of putting in political commissars in the Army, is one of the reasons for each belief, in that respect.

We see no signs, however, of a change in their foreign policy as far as objectives are concerned. They are more flexible. Fraternization is on. The Russians are perfectly willing now to mix—where they never would before—with the foreigner. They are trying to give outwardly a more flexible, a more amenable air; but when it comes to the hard question as to whether they will make any concessions, either in regard to Europe

mental attitude of their negotiators. The result is that we see no reason to relax as far as we are concerned. The policy in fact is more astute and a good deal cleverer because the present policy of the Soviet plays to the neutralist tendencies of many countries of the world, particularly countries like India, countries in Southeast Asia, and to certain people even on the Continent of Europe especially in France and in Italy.

Regarding Soviet intentions, it is our view that the seviet does not now desire to provoke a hot war. They could stumble into one. They might feel they were crowded into one, but we do not feel looking over the next couple of years, that the Soviets desire deliberately to provoke, or by surprise attack to initiate, a hot war within that period. It is hazardous to predict for a longer period. They are doing well in the cold war. They have prospects for further successes in the Far East particularly in Indochina.

They are also building up their atomic stockpile to formidable size, and they are constantly improving their long-range bomber fleet— I will speak of that a little later.

The Soviet has such inherent military strength that it wouldn't be safe for us to let our guard down. They have a great advantage, of course, in having a central position from which they can strike out in various directions, protected by their great land mass, the Soviet mion. Including Siberia, and the flanked by their satellites. One of the reasons for their keeping a tight hold on the satellites is to protect the Soviet heartland. That makes them, as history has shown, in the long run relatively invulnerable to land attack, and presumably therefore only

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ably the Soviet Army, plus their security broops. I should say military forces—Army, Navy, and Air Force—would be around 4.5 million. There are an additional million in China and about million in the satellites, making a military force—Army, Navy, Air Force, and security forces—of around million in the Soviet orbit,

To turn to a point even more interesting from your angle--their Total numbers are probably very misleading. They have a longrange bomber force based on the B-29 that they obtained from us during the war, probably somewhat improved. We would estimate that they have between 1,000 and 1,500 of these medium bombers, called the TU-4. total range stripped down would be 4,000 to 4,500 miles probably. would mean that these bombers are capable on a one-way mission of reaching almost any important point in the United States. Those of you who live in the tip of Florida, southern part of Texas, probably have a little more immunity than those living in the other parts of the country. But, by and large, assuming they did not care whether the planes got back or not, they could reach any part of the United States -- practically any part They have not yet significant numbers of heavy of the United States. bombers which could get to the United States and get back to their base 1. Of course, with refueling -- and we must assume that they have the to refuel -- they could reach a good part of the United States and presumably, get back. They could not reach all of the United States; and refueling in a long-range mission of this kind--particularly two-way refueling-presents serious difficulties. One refueling presents act many difficulties, assuming they have the techniques that we have.

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We have felt that in the scientific and technical field, it is not safe for us to assume that we can do things they can't do. There is nothing wrong with the Russian brain. When they put their mind to it, with the help they have received from the scientists they have acquired from other countries, stolen from other countries, particularly sermany, they have the technical ability in any particular field. Where it comes to aircraft, engines for MIC aircraft, radar, and what they have done in the thermonuclear field, they have in many respects surprised us by the speed and skill with which they have results that we had hoped they would not reach. So in general we assume—and must assume to be safe, and what we certainly in the Central Intelligence Agency—that they can do what we can

Where it comes to mass production, where it comes to the technical skills—right down the line—where it comes to doing what we do in our automobile and our other factories—no, I don't think they can do the because by and large, taking the Soviet citizen from top to bottom, the level of intelligence of the American and of many of the Europeans is higher. The educational standards in the Soviet Union are and if you can give them a long time, they may be the proficiency that we have now reached. I think our great superiority lies in the character and ability of the American citizen from top to bottom, and we should not count very largely on a great technical superiority in the scientific field.

That was a little aside, as I was dealing with the aircraft situation, but I tried to make clear on the bember situation, one-way mission, when can reach practically any target in the United States. Now, as to whether

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Peterson and others, because my problem is looking at the Soviet Union and not looking so much at what we can do in the way of counterattack.

Whether they would risk their planes on suicide missions of this kind, whether they would not prefer to wait, if they are going to attack, until they have the long-range bomber that we now believe they are starting in production and may have in a couple of years—that is a question that I cannot answer today. But we are inclined to think that certain of the reasons which would lead them not to attack at the moment would be the fact that they do not have long-range bomber capacity that they could come to the United States and so have and also, as I will come to plater; they certainly presumably would desire to increase their stockpile of atomic weapons before they made the attack, if they had the choice, unless they felt they are forced in a situation where they had to attack.

We know they have the MIG-15, an excellent plane for defense. They have that in mass production, and they have quite a lot of them. They have a good light bomber, jet bomber; the TU-1 that I mentioned before is a propeller than the state of the May lies chiefly in their large submarine force, and a certain number of good cruisers. They have no aircraft carrier at the moment, and they only have a few obsolete battleships.

They have developed their submarines and they have developed their cruisers. both light and heavy.

On the atomic side, the President the other day in his speech at the UN gave you the essential facts, and I won't repeat what he said there. They have had some tests. They have produced atomic bombs. We believe they have a substantial stockpile of atomic bombs of various types.

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They have produced at least a prototype bomb with thermonuclear reactions, indicating the possibility that they have or will shortly have weapons with a very high amount of explosive power.

We have some ideas about their stockpile. Naturally, we keep those ideas secret, just as we keep our own stockpile secret. But, if they were forced into a situation where they felt it was necessary or desirable to attack the United States, and if they could get their bombers through, it would be unsafe to assume that they could not put on us a substantial load of atomic bombs. I don't think they have the kind of stockpile they would like to have to make that sort of attack, but it would not be safe for us to assume that they do not have very serious potentialities, immediately, in that field.

I noticed some questions that were submitted by several of the Mayors from California, in which they also raised the question of bacteriological warfare. Our general view on that is this: Where you have a
choice of weapons, you choose the weapon that you think is most destructive. We believe that at the present time if they had a choice of carrying an atomic weapon or a bacteriological or gas warfare weapon, they
would choose the first—that is, the atomic. We should not, however,
let our guards down as to the possible developments both in the bacteriological and in the field of chemical warfare.

To back their defensive system, the Soviets are developing economic strength. Their gross national production has been increasing very rapidly, over recent years at the rate of about 7 or 8 percent per annum over the last four years. That will probably level off. On the military purposes much larger proportion of their industrial production than we do. They don't go in so much for refrigerators,

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automobiles, and so forth. They go in for planes and tanks instead.

Fhave one or two examples here. Take electronics, We believe about

90 percent of their work in electronics goes into the military, sides,

whereas with us it is only about 37 percent—and that is rather typical.

I mentioned that in the agricultural field they were having certain difficulties, and they have had to admit that in certain sectors of their agriculture they have made really no progress, as far as production is concerned from the days before World War I.

I said at the beginning that we thought it was unlikely that they would deliberately choose war at this time. One of the reasons for reaching that conclusion is that they are quite successful with certain techniques that they are a the policy of divide and penstrate. With their phony peace offensive they are trying to divide us. In their propaganda campaigns they have been extremely effective. particularly in Europe, in France, and Ttaly. We know of the influence they have in various parts of Southeast Asia. They have other possibilities for maneuvering, particularly in the Far East. The result is that since they have not yet the capacity they would desire, either from the point of view of atomic weapons or aircraft, and because they have still a good deal of maneuverability in the foreign field, in their policy we are inclined to think they would choose the latter that is to continue the cold war, rather than to indulge immediately in a hot war.

There is no reason for either panic or complacency. While we cannot guarantee to you time, we believe that there will be time for planning.

But that time should be used. We have to keep in mind that the Soviet

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has the present capacity to inflict very serious damage, but probably not the intention of immediately using it. Consequently, we have a duty to be on the alert from now on, particularly in view of the unresolved wars in Korea and Indochina which might create at any time political impasses which in the Societ's view might force them to change policy. Unless the issues that face has are solved or eased coming yours. I am afraid the have to look forward to the possibility that our dangers will increase over the next three to five years as their potentiality both from the point of view of long-range aircraft and atomic bombs increases. But that is a potentiality we should face with calm planning rather than with panic.

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OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

Monorable Allen W. Dulles Director, Central Intelligence Agency Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

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Mowever, a resume with classified matter deleted -- as you suggest -- will be appreciated. We are most anxious to get all of the Conference speeches, or resumes, in the hands of the printer as soon as possible. The demand from mayors for this material is brisk because of their inability to determine what should, and should not, be reported to their people.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

SGD VAL PETERSON

Val Peterson

Enclosure

ER5-33-5

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# FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

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Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. July

Thank you for your letter of February 25 in which you enclosed for our confidential files a corrected text of your remarks before the White House Conference of Mayors.

I want to assure you that we are following the intent of your policy concerning publicizing intelligence appraisals. No part of the text of your remarks will appear in the collection of speeches made by various government officials before the Mayors Conference, which is intended for public distribution. However, the report does note that you were among the speakers.

May I thank you for your kind offer to work with me and iff necessary with the Atomic Energy Commission on matters of this sort which may require security considerations, in the future.

Val Peterson

25 February 1954

The Honorable Val Peterson, Administrator Federal Civil Defease Administration Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Val:

I beg to refer to my letter of 23 January and your reply of 8 February 1954 with regard to my informal remarks before the Washington Conference of Mayors.

As indicated in my letter of 23 January, we have a general policy here of not giving any publicity to our intelligence appraisals. These go to those whom we serve on the National Security Council and to other agencies of the government within the scope of their respective activities. This, of course, includes the FCDA. I think, therefore, it would be better not to include in what you may be distributing as a result of the Mayors' Conference, any summary of my remarks as such. If you feel that there are intelligence aspects of the problem which the public needs to know and which can be given out without any breach of security, I suggest they be given out by you as Administrator, or by the FCDA, if you wish to do it impersonally. In that case, I would be glad to work with you, and if necessary, consult with the Atomic Energy Commission, to make sure that what was given out was consistent with the necessary security considerations.

I am sending you, under separate cover, for your confidential files, a corrected text of my remarks before the Mayors' Conference.

Sincerely yours,

Allen W. Dulles
Director

AWD:hea
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# 14

19 February 1954

The Henorable Val Peterson, Administrator Federal Civil Defense Administration Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Governor Paterson:

This will acknowledge your letter of 15 February requesting me to accress the Washington Conference of Governors at 11:55 a.m. on 27 April 195h. This will be entirely convenient for me and I am very glad to be able to assist in this very vital Conference.

Simperely yours,

SIGNED

Allen W. Dulles Director

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## FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ADMINISTRATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

FEB 1 5 1954

Honorable Allen W. Dulles Director, Central Intelligence Agency Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

The Washington Conference of Governors which was announced at the Cabinet meeting on January 29 has been set for April 27 and 28. It will follow the pattern of the one last May and the subjects to be discussed are national security, foreign policy, intergovernmental relations, and economic developments, with special emphasis on taxation and fiscal policies.

The President urges the participation of members of the Cabinet and heads of those agencies concerned. Accordingly, the Conference program will not be complete without a message from you. We should greatly appreciate it if you would give an Intelligence Briefing, and participate in a brief discussion following.

I have been designated as the coordinator of the program for the Federal Government, and the agenda which we have worked out has the approval of the White House. We are scheduling you to appear on the program at 11:55 a.m., on April 27. Will this suit your convenience? The meeting will be held in the Indian Treaty Room, which is Room 474 in the Executive Office Building.

Sincerely,

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# Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001000030023-5 FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

DEC2 : 1988

Honorable Allen W. Dulles Director, Central Intelligence Agency Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

Attached is the transcript of your remarks to the White House Conference of Mayors (December 14-15).

May we have your edited version of this transcript, or a brief resume if you prefer, for dissemination to mayors attending the Conference, American Municipal Association, U. S. Conference of Mayors, State and local civil defense directors, and public information media.

An early return of this material will be sincerely appreciated.

Sincerely,

SGD VAL PETERSON

Val Peterson

Attachment

MR. DULLES: I have asked Gov. Peterson's permission to reverse him on one point. I am not afraid of questions. If I can't or shouldn't answer them, I will let you know very frankly. While I only have 20 minutes to address you, I will try to cut off at least three or four of the minutes at the end so if there are any questions you can put them to me. I may be seeing some of you this afternoon at the White House, and we can get ingether there possibly if there are any more.

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When you are dealing with Russia, sometimes the best you can do is to come up with a really uneducated guess, based on inadequate facts, and an estimate of what they have done in the past.

your particular functions as Mayors of our great cities—the Soviets are able to learn a great deal more about us than we are about them. We publish the essential facts of our situation to the world. We tell the world where our installations are, where we are making this and that. We gave them a great deal of information. In fact, I think we give them probably too much, but it is very difficult. When you have to decide between the maintenance of your freedoms, your freedom of the press and your other freedoms, and possibly disclosing more information than I would like to see disclosed, I can quite understand that maybe our freedoms are much more important. If we start to abridge them in any respect, it is hard to tell where we will end.

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see it. When Stalin died, early last spring, a change came about in the Soviet Union; but that change, in our opinion, has not affected its foreign policy. It was largely an internal matter. We had not realized and not until Stalin's death did we realize—the extent to which that old dictator had really taken hold of the country and of all the people there and forced it into a pattern that was not a pattern that the other leaders of the Kremlin liked. When Stalin was buried, he was really buried; and one of the extraordinary things is the extent to which they have buried his memory. There has been very little mention of Stalin. The Lenin line has been disinterred and brought out again; the Stalin line has been pretty well interred.

He had frozen the Soviet internal policy into a rigid framework and the framework is still rigid enough. He had set so rigid a framework that the people themselves were beginning to feel impatient. He had frozen their foreign policies into a rigidity that even man like Molotov did not like. They blamed Stalin for the break with Yugoslavia. They probably blamed Stalin pretty largely for the war in Korea and for man other rigid actions in foreign policy. So when he disappeared, they decided to change certain features of their system. That does not mean, as I said before, that they have relaxed to any great extent. They have clamped certain restrictions on the internal police. Beria's dismissal and disappearance is undoubtedly due to the fact that they wanted to care the secret police. They more or less put a sign up: Don't walk on the

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more or less a sign: Keep off the grass and we will give you a little

more freedom internally than you had before.

They also found apparently that they weren't giving their people enough from the point of view of consumer's goods, and they are making a real effort now to give them more consumer's goods. One of the interesting things that we have to watch is as to what extent, if at all, that will force them to cut down on their production of munitions and war material. So Car we have seen very little sign of that. They have been using recently quite a little of their gold to buy consumer's goods in the foreign market. Whether that will continue or not, I don't know. You may have seen in the papers reports of sale of Soviet gold. That is going on; and, while this year's sale will not greatly exceed last year's sale, the sale of the last three or four months has gone up quite spectacularly, largely, we think, so they can buy consumer's goods in the market.

We believe that the military now exercise greater authority in the Soviet Union than they did before Stalin's death. It is hard to prove that, but the disgrace of Beria, who was the artison of putting in politic cal commissars in the Army, is one of the reasons for our belief in that respect.

We see no signs, however, of a change in their foreign policy as far as objectives are concerned. They are more flexible. Praternisation is on. They are perfectly willing now to mix--where they never would before -- with the foreigner. They are trying to give outwardly a more flexible, a more amenable air; but when it comes to the hard question as

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to whether they will make any concessions, either in regard to a peace with Germany to unify Germany, as regards a treaty with Austria, or as regards a treaty in Korea, we find no change whatever in the fundamental attitude of their negotiators. The result is that we see no reason to relax as far as we are concerned. The policy in fact is more astute and a good deal cleverer because the present policy of the Soviet plays into the neutralist tendencies of many countries of the world, particularly countries like India, countries in Southeast Asia, and to certain people even on the Continent of Europe in France and in Italy.

now desire to provoke a hot war. They might stumble into one. They might feel they were crowded into one, but we do not feel, looking over the next six, eight months, or a year, that the Soviets desire deliberately to provoke, or by surprise attack to initiate, a hot war within that period. It is hard to predict for a longer period. They are doing well in the old war. That is one of the reasons. They have prospects for further successes in the Far East. The situation in Indochina is a difficult one. The situation in Korea is a difficult one. They view it as a situation fraught with possibilities as far as they are concerned.

They desire also to build up their atomic stockpile, and they desire presumably to build up their long-range bomber fleet--and I will speak of that a little later.

The Soviet has, however, such inherent strength in the militar; and other points of view, that it wouldn't be safe for us to let our guards down. Here are some of their elements of strength. They have a great advantage, of course, in having a central position from which they can strike

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out in various directions, protected by their great land mass, the Soviet
Union, including Siberia, and then flanked by their satellites. One of
the reasons for their keeping a tight hold on the satellites is to protect the Soviet heartland. That makes them, as history has shown, in the
long rum relatively invulnerable to land attack, and presumably therefore
only vulnerable to air attack. They have a very large standing Army.

Probably the Soviet Army, plus their security troops—I should say military
forces—Army, Navy, and Air Forces—would be around 4.5 million. There is
an additional 4 million in China and about half a million in the satellites,
making a military force—Army, Navy, Air Force, and security forces—of around
10 million in the Soviet orbit.

Air Force: Total numbers are probably very misleading. They have a long-range bomber force based on the B-29 prototype that they obtained from a and used during the war, probably seasonat improved. We would estimate that they have between 1,000 and 1,500 of these medium bombers, called the TU-1. Their total range stripped down would be somewhat over 4,000 miles -- 4,000 to 4,500 miles probably. That would mean that these bombers are capable on a one-way mission of reaching almost any important point in the United States. Those of you who live in the tip of Florida, southern part of Texas, probably have a little more immunity than those living in the other parts of the country. But, by and large, assuming they did not care whether the planes got back or not, they could reach any part of the United States--practically any part of the United States. They have not a heavy bomber at the present time which would have the capacity to get

Approved For Release 2005/11/28: CIA-RDP80B01676R001000030023-5 and we must assume that they have the power to refuel--they could reach a good part of the United States and presumably get back. They could not reach all of the United States; and refueling in a long-range mission of this kind--particularly two-way refueling--presents serious difficulties. One refueling presents not many difficulties, assuming they have the techniques that we have.

I may say right here that we have felt that in the scientific and technical field, it is not safe for us to assume that we can do things they can't do. There is nothing among with the Russian brain. When they put their mind to it, with the help they have received from the scientists they have acquired from other countries and stolen from other countries. particularly Germany, they have the technical ability in any particular field. Where it comes to aircraft, engines for MIG aircraft, radar, and what they have done in their thermonucleur field, they have in many respects surprised us by the speed and skill with which they have reached results that we had hoped they would not reach. So in general we assume—and must assume to be safe—certainly in the Central Intelligence Agency—that day can do what we can do.

where it comes to mass production, where it comes to the technical skills--right down the line--where it comes to doing what we do in our automobile and our other factories--no, I don't think they can do it, be cause by and large, taking the Soviet citizen from top to bettom, the level of intelligence of the American and of many of the Europeans is higher. The educational standards in the Seviet Union are increasing, and if you can give them a long time, they may reach the proficiency that we

Approved For Release 2005/11/28: CIA-RDP80B01676R001000030023-5 have now reached. I think our great superiority lies in the character and ability of the American citizen from top to bottom, and we should not count very largely on a great technical superiority merely is the scientific field. That was a little aside as I was dealing with the aircraft situation, but I tried to make clear on the bomber situation, one-way mission, they can reach practically any target in the United States. Now, as to whether they can get through our defense, you will haar about that from Gov. Peterson and others, because my problem is looking at the Soviet Union and not looking so much at what we can do in the way of a counterattack. Whether they would risk their planes on suicide mission of this kind, whether they would not prefer to wait, if they are going to attack, until they have the long-range bomber that we now believe they are starting in production and may have in a couple of years -- that is a question that I cannot answer today. But we are inclined to think that certain of the reasons which would lead them not to attack at the moment would be the fact that they do not have long-range bomber capacity that they could come to the United States and go back and also, as I will none to later, they certainly presumably would desire to increase their stockpile of atomic weapons before they made the attack, if they had the choice, weless they felt they were forced to a situation where they had to attack.

We know they have the MIG-15, an excellent plane for defease.

They have that in mass production, and they have quite a lot of them.

They have a good light bomber, jet bomber, the TU-4 that I mentioned before is a prop bomber (propeller). The IL-28 is only available for shorter

Approved For Release 2005/11/28: CIA-RDP80B01676R001000030023-5 missions. The force of the Navy lies chiefly in their submarine force, and a certain number of good cruisers. They have no aircraft carrier at the moment, and they only have a few obsolete battleships. They have developed their submarines and they have developed their cruisers, both light and heavy.

On the atomic side, the President the other day in his speech at the UN gave you the essential facts, and I von't repeat what he said there. They have had some tests. They have produced in prototype at least atomic bombs. We believe they have a substantial stockpile of atomic bombs of various types. They may well have weapons. They have produced certain bombs with thermonuclear reactions, indicating the possibility that they have or will shortly have weapons with a very high amount of explosive power, going into the megatons.

those ideas secret, just as we keep our own stockpile secret, but it would not be safe to assume that--if they were forced into a situation where they felt it was necessary or desirable to attack the United States, a suming they could get their bombers through--they could put on us a substantial load of atomic bombs. I don't think they have the kind of stockpile they would like to have to make that sort of attack, but it would not be safe for us to assume that they do not have certain potentialities immediately in that field.

I noticed some questions that were submitted by several of the Mayors from California, in which they also raised the question of bacteriological warfare. Our general view on that is this: Where you have a

Approved For Release 2005/11/28: CIA-RDP80B01676R001000030023-5 choice of weapons, you choose the weapon that you think is most destructive. We believe that at the present time if they had a choice of carrying an atomic weapon or a bacteriological or gas warfare weapon, they would choose the first—that is, the stomic. We should not, however, let our guards down as to the possible developments both in the bacteriological and in the field of chemical warfare.

strength. Their gross national production has been increasing very rapidly over recent years at the rate of about 7 or 8 percent per annum over the last four years. That will probably level off because that is a faster rate than our own gross national production is increasing. That is a little misleading on the military side because they devote to the military purposes so much larger proportions of their gross national production than we do. They don't go in so much for refrigerators, automobiles, and so forth. They go in for planes and tanks in a much greater percentage than we do. I have one or two examples here. Take electronics: We believe about 90 percent of their work in electronics goes into the military side, whereas with us it is only about 37 percent—and that is rather typical.

I mentioned that in the agricultural field they were having certain difficulties, and they have had to admit that their agricultural situation has made really no progress as far as production is concerned from the days before the war.

T said at the beginning that we thought it was unlikely that they would deliberately choose wer at this time. One of the reasons for our reaching that conclusion is that they are quite successful with certain techniques that they are carrying on now--the policy of divide and penetrate.

With their phony peace offensive they are trying to divide us. My former

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boss General Bedell Smith will tell you more about that. I just saw him come into the room. In their propagands campaigns they have been extremely effective. They have their apparati abroad and their communist parties in various countries, particularly in Europe, in France, and in Italy. We know of the influence they have in various parts of Southeast Asia. The have other possibilities for maneuvering, particularly in the Far East. The result is that since they have not yet the capacity they would desire either from the point of view of atomic weapons or aircraft, and because they have still a good deal of maneuverability in the foreign field, in their policy we are inclined to think they would choose the latter—that is, to continue the cold war, rather than to indulge immediately in a hot war.

Consequently, I would just like to take up the words that the President used in concluding. There is no reason for either panie or complacency. While we cannot guarantee to you time, we believe that there will be time for planning. But that time should be used. We have to keep in mind that the Soviet has the present capacity to inflict serious damage, but probably not with the intention of immediately using it. Consequently, we have a duty to be on the alert from now on, particularly in view of the unresolved wars in Korea and Indochina which might create at any time political impasses which in the Soviet's view might force them to change their policy. Unless the issues that face us are solved or eased over the coming years, I am afraid we have to look forward to the possibility that our dangers will increase over the next three to five years as their potentiality both from the point of view of long-range aircraft and atomic bombs increases. But that is a potentiality, as the President said, we should face with calm planning rather than with panic.

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him on one point. I welcose questions. If I can't or shouldn't answer them, I will let you know very frankly. While I only have 23 minutes to address you, I will try to cut off at least three or four of the minutes at the end so if there are any questions you can at item to me. I may be seeing some of you this afternoon at the shifts flows, and we can get together there possibly if there are any more.

The job of the Central Intelligence Agency is to try to flavor out facts and present those facts to the policy skers of lever said. It is not our job to say what should be done with the facts. It is the level our job—and that is a hard enough one—to try to find out with the last said.

When you are dealing with Russia, sometimes the best you can do in to come up with an educated guess, based on inadequate facts, and an estimate of what they have done in the yest.

In that connection—and this is more from the point of view of your particular functions as sayons of our great cities—the Societa are able to learn a great deal more about us than we are about them. To publish the essential facts of our situation to the world. We talk the world where our installations are, where we are makin; this and them. We ave them a great deal of information. In fact, I think we give the proof ably too much, but it is a very difficult problem. Then you have to deed a between the maintenance of our freedoms, our freedom of the proof or our other freedoms, and possibly disclosing more information than are intelligence officer would like to see disclosed, I can quite indems and that maybe our freedoms are much more important. If we start to disclose them in any respect, it is hard to tell where we will only.

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To turn briefly to the position of the Soviet Indon as we see the Shann Stalin died, early hast sprang, a change came about in the Soviet Union; but that change, he our opinion, has not affected its basic Unionality. The change was bangely internal. We had not realise has a lost until Stalin's death did we realise—the extent to which that the obtained to had extend to had really taken hold of the country and of all the people has been forced it into a pattern that was not a pattern that the star landars of the Krealin Liked. When Stalin was buried, he was really buries; and one of the extraordinary things is the extent to which his successful have buried his memory. There has been very little mention of that in.

The Lemin line has been disinterned and brought out again; the Stalin line has been pretty well interned.

and the framework is still rigid enough. He had set so rigid a Transmorthat the people themselves name beginning to feel impations. He had not like a fireful policies into a rigidity that even can hime themselves the a rigidity that even can hime themselves. They blaned Stalin for the break with Yagoslavia. They probably blaned Stalin pretty largely for the mar in Horse and for one other rigid actions in foreign pelicy. So when he disappeared, that decided to change certain features of their system. That does not so as I said before, that they have relaxed to any great extent. They have classed to any great extent. They have classed certain restrictions on the internal police. Herists due has a new look at the cituation. They have classed certain restrictions on the internal police. Herists due has a new looks at the cituation of the hard and execution is undoubtedly due to the fact that they wanted to next the secret police. They more or loss put a sign ups floats malk at the

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grass, but if you walk on the path, we wan't warry you so math. In the other days, you mover could bell-you might be walking on the party of the path.

They also found apparently that they ware t giving their count enough from the point of view of communer's green, and they are white a real effort now to give to an ones. One of the interesting of hope had no have to watch is so to read extent. If at all, that will force the a to cut down on their production of amitions and war substitute. If the wall force the are have soon very little edge of any reduction. They have some said recently quite a little of Sair gold to buy resummer's golds in he forced market. The may have soon in the papers reports of sair of Saviet gold. That is going out the gold salar of the hast three or to a menths have gone up on to openhandarly, largely, we think, so that can buy communer's goods to the market.

Soviet Union then they did before Stallin's deeth. It is birdl's 100 that, but the execution of losis, who was the artisen of luttin in 1912... cal consistent in the arry, is eas of the respons for our letter in 1925 respect.

en far as objectives ere concerned. They are more flexible. There exists as one flexible. There exists are perfectly villing now to six-water have mover would before—with the foreigner. They are trying to give a therefore were flexible, a seconomical size but when it comes to the hard on still as to whether they will make any concessions, a there in request to the upon

or as regards a treaty in Norte, we find no change whatever in the finds a mental attitude of their negotiators. The result is that us do no mean to relax as far as we are concerned. The policy in fact is not not at the and a good deal clowerer because the present policy of the Soviet place into the neutralist tencenter of many countries of the reality partialist; countries like India, countries in Southeast Asia, and to certain partial even on the Continent of Europe especially in France and in Italy.

now desire to provoke a hot war. They could stumble into one, they ride feel they were growded into one, but we do not feel, locking two the new couple of years, that the book to desire deliberately to provide, or to surprise attack to initiate, a hot mar within that period. It is he ware one to predict for a longer period. They are coing well in the cold ware finded have prospects for further successes in the Far East period by in Indoching.

They are also building up their atomic stockpile to formionally interested their long-range bombur due to all their will speak of that a little later.

and for us to let our querds down. They have a great advanture, as course, in having a central position from which they can state our in the various directions, protected by their great land same, the same of the reasons for their keepings tight hold on the catellites is to sected the Soviet heartland. That sakes then, as history has them, to in land run relatively invaluerable to land attack, and presumably where tree on a

ably the Soviet Army, plus their security troops—I should sep military forces—Army, Navy, and Air Porce—sould be around h.5 million. There is an additional 4 million in China and about half a million in the same lites, making a military force—Army, Navy, Air Porce, and security force—of around 9 million in the Soviet orbit.

To turn to a point even more interesting from your angle-discir Air Porce: Total members are probably very mislanding. They law a lanrange bomber force based on the 8-29 that they obtained from up during the war, probably somewhat laproved. We would optimate that they had between 1,000 and 1,500 of these medium beabers, called the Title. Bear total range stripped down would be 4,000 to 4,500 miles probably. If an would mean that these bushers are capable on a one-way mission of remaining almost any important point in the United States. Those of greating Live in the tip of Florida, southern part of Texas, probably have a little by and large, assuming they did not care whether the planes got back or not, they could reach any part of the United States-practically any part of the United States. They have not yet got significant makers of many boshers which could get to the Inited States and get back to their in se. Of course, with refeeling-and we must assume that they have the power to refuel-they could reach a good part of the United States and premamble get back. They could not reach all of the United States; and refuniting in a long-range mineion of this kind-particularly two-way refleting presents serious difficulties. One refueling presents not can difficulties. ties, asseming they have the techniques that we have.

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where it comes to make production, where it comes to the technical skills—right down the line—when it comes to coing what we do in a remotes which and our other factories—no, I don't think they can do it, because by and large, taking the Seviet citizen from top to betten, the level of intelligence of the American and of many of the Suroptane is higher. The educational standards in the Seviet Union are irrecasing, and if you can give them a long time, they may reach the proflictionary when we have now reached. I think our great superiority lies in the characters and ability of the American citizen from top to bottom, and we should not count very largely on a great technical superiority serely in the scientific field.

That was a little asside as I was dealing with the aircreft situation, but I tried to make clear to the bosher situation, one-way mission, buy can reach practically any target in the United States. Now, as to statistics

Peterson and others, because my problem is locking at the Southt Dalon and not looking so much at what we can do in the way of a markershipship and not looking so much at what we can do in the way of a markershipship and not looking so much at what we can do in the way of a markershipship whether they would risk their planes on suicide missions of this kind, whether they would not prefer to wait, if they are going to strack, make they have the long-range bomber that we now believe they are missisting in production and may have in a comple of person-that is a question them. I cannot answer today. But we are inclined to think that contain of the reasons which would lead them not to attack at the moment would be the fact that they do not have lang-range bomber capacity that they occide come to the United States and go back and also, as I will come to later, they cartainly presumably would desire to increase their stodepile of atomic weapons before they made the attack, if they had the decime, unlines they felt they were forted to a situation where they had to at ack.

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correter at the messer, and they only have a few checket battleships.

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On the storic side, the President the other day in his special at the UN gave you the connectial facts, and I won't repeat what he said thent. They have had some tests, They have produced atomic banks. We believe they have a substantial stockpile of atomic banks of various types.

They have produced at least a prototype bash with thermanicher respictors; indicating the possibility that they have or will shortly have make with a very high amount of explosive power.

these ideas secret, just as we keep our own stockpile secret. But, if they were forced into a minutian where they felt it was necessar! or desirable to attack the United States, and if they could get their burbers through, it would be unserfe to assume that they could not put on us a substantial load of stords borbs. I don't think they have the least of stockpile they would him to have to make that sort of attack, but it would not be safe for us to assume that they do not have very serious potentialities immediately in that field.

I noticed ease questions that were submitted by several of the impore from California, in which they also reject the question of instantial characters. Our general view on that is this: There you have a choice of weapons, you choose the weapon that you think is main desirantive. We believe that at the present time if they had a choice of caractering an about weapon or a besteriological or gue weather weapon, they would choose the first-other is, the storde. We should not, however, let our guards down as to the possible developments both in the less art-ological and in the field of chemical warfare.

To back their defengive system, the formets are developing one make strength. Their gross anticael production has been inspecien; very republic over recent years at the rate of about 7 or 6 parcent per annual over the last four years. That will probably level off. On the military site they devote to military purposes much larger proportions of facts industrial.

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automobiles, and so forth. They go in for planes and tanks instead.

I have one or two examples here. Take electronics—We believe above.

90 percent of their work in electronics goes into the military side,
whereas with us it is only about 37 percent-pad that is retine typical.

I mentioned that in the agricultural field they were having correcte difficulties, and they have had to admit that in certain scotters of their agriculture they have made really no progress so far as production in concerned from the days before Forld War I.

would deliberately choose mer at this time. One of the reserve for reaching that conclusion is that they are quite successful with derivin techniques that they are corrying on non-the policy of divide and manufactor. With their phony peace effective they are trying to divide and manufactor. Buth their phony peace effective they are trying to divide a. In their propagands compaigns they have been extremely effective. Buy have their apparation and their communist parties in various excipring particularly in hardes, in Frence, and in Italy. We know of the influence they have in various parts of Southeast Asia. They have other possibilities for maneuvering, particularly in the Far Sast. The result is that added they have not yet the capacity they would desire either from the point of view of abords weepens or aircraft, and because they have still a good deal of maneuvershelling in the foreign field, in their policy to are uncollined to think they would chopen the latter—that is, to continue the cold war, rather than to include immediately in a hot war.

There is no reason for either panis or complicancy. Wills we cannot guarantee to you time, we believe that there will be time for planeia;. But that time should be used. We have to keep in mind that the Soviet.

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MR. DULLES: I have asked Gov. Peterson's permission to reverse him on one point. I as more arranged for questions. If I can't or shouldn' answer them, I will let you know very frankly. While I only have 20 minutes to address you, I will try to cut off at least three or four of the minutes at the end so if there are any questions you can put them to me. I may be seeing some of you this afternoon at the White House, and we can get together there possibly if there are any more.

the job of the Gentral Intelligence Agency is to try to ferret out facts and present those facts to the policymakers of Covernment. It is not our job to say what should be done with the facts. It is merely our job—and that is a hard enough one—to try to find out what the facts are.

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your particular functions as Mayors of our great cities—the Soviets are able to learn a great deal more about us than we are about them. We publish the essential facts of our situation to the world. We tell the world where our installations are, where we are making this and that. We give them a great deal of information. In fact, I think we give them probably too much, but it is very difficult. When you have to decide between the maintenance of four freedoms, your freedom of the press and four other freedoms, and possibly disclosing more information than I would dike to see disclosed, I can quite understand that maybe our freedoms are much more important. If we start to abridge them in any respect, it is hard to tell where we will end.

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see it. When Stalin died, early last spring, a change case shout in
the Seviet Union; but that change, in our opinion, has not affected its died.
foreign policy. It was largely an internal matter. We had not realised and not until Stalin's death did we realise—the extent to which that old distator had really taken hold of the country and of all the people there and forced it into a pattern that was not a pattern that the other le ders of the Eremlin liked. When Stalin was buried, he was really beried; and one of the extraordinary things is the extent to which they have buried his memory. There has been very little mention of Stalin. The Leain line has been disinterred and brought out again; the Stalin line has been

and the framework is still rigid enough. He had set so rigid is framework that the people themselves were beginning to feel impatient. He had from their foreign policies into a rigidity that even sen like Molector did not like. They blased Stalin for the break with Tugoslavia. They probably blased Stalin pretty largely for the war in Korea and for semy other rigid actions in foreign policy. So when he disappeared, they decided to change certain features of their system. That does not mean, as I said before, that they have relaxed to any great entent. They have, however, in agriculture taken a new look at the situation. They have classed certain restrictions on the internal police. Beria's disatural and allegations is undoubtedly due to the fact that they wanted to me the secret police. They more or less put a might up: Den't walk on the

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grass, but if you walk on the path, we won't worry you so much. In the other days, you never could tell--you might be walking on the grass or walking on the path and still you find yourself in jail. Now there is now or less a sign: Keep off the grass and we will give you a little more freedom internally than you had before.

enough from the point of view of consumer's goods, and they are making real effort now to give them more consumer's goods. One of the interesting things that we have to watch is as to what extent, if at all, that will form them to cut down on their production of manitions and war material. So far we have seen very little sign of that. They have been using recently quite a little of their gold to buy consumer's goods in the foreign market.

Matther that will continue or not, I don't know. You may have seen in the papers reports of sale of Soviet gold. That is going on; and, while this year's relative will not greatly exceed last year's sale, the sale of the list three or four months has gone up quite spectacularly, largely, we think, and they can buy consumer's goods in the market.

We believe that the military now exercise greater authority in the Soviet Union than they did before Stalin's death. It is hard to prove that, but the diagrams of Beria, who was the artisan of putting in political cal commissars in the Army, is one of the reasons for our belief in the respect.

We see no signs, however, of a change in their foreign policy as far as objectives are concerned. They are more flexible. Fraternization is on. They are perfectly villing now to mix-where they never would before-with the foreigner. They are trying to give outwirtly a core flexible, a more amenable air; but when it comes to the hard question as

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with Germany to unify Germany, as requires treath with Amstria, or as regards a treaty in Korea, we find no change whatever in the fundamental attitude of their negotiators. The result is that we see no reason to relax as far as we are connersed. The policy in fact is more astate and a good deal cleverer because the present policy of the Soviet plays into the neutralist tendencies of many countries of the world, particularly the fundamental like fields, countries in Southeast Asia; and to certain people particularly and to certain people of the Continent of Europe and Management Asia; and to certain people of the Continent of Europe and Management Asia; and to certain people of the Continent of Europe and Management Asia; and to certain people

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now desire to provoke a hot war. They make stumble into one. They might feel they were created into one, but we do not feel, looking over the next attack months or a year, that the Soviets desire deliberately to provoke, or by surprise attack to initiate, a hot war within that period It is been to predict for a longer period. They are doing well in the cold war. That is one of the seasons. They have prospects for further successes in the Far East. The situation in Indechina is a difficult one. The situation with possibilities as far as they are conserved.

They desire also to build up their atesis stockpile, and they constructly supported their long-range bosber float--and I will speak of that a little later.

The Soviet has however such inherent strength inche military
and other points of view, that it wouldn't be safe for us to let our number
down. Here were come of the released of changes in they have a great adventtage, of course, in having a central position from which they can strike

Union, including Siberia, and then flambed by their satellites. One of the reasons for their beeping a tight hold on the satellites is to protect the Soviet heartland. That makes them, as history has shown, in the long run relatively invulnerable to land attack, and presumably therefore (and only vulnerable to air attack. They have a very large standing Army.

Probably the Soviet Army, plus their security troops—I should say military forces—Army, Havy, and Air Force—would be assembled million. There is an additional 4 million in China and about half a million in the satellites, making a military force—Army, Havy, Air Force, and security forces—of around million in the Soviet orbit.

Air Force: Total numbers are probably very misleading. They have a long-range beater force based on the 8-29 probablys—that they obtained from as appeared during the war, probably somewhat improved. We would estimate that they have between 1,000 and 1,500 of these medium beaters, dalled the TU-4. Their total range stripped down would be constitute work by 500 miles probably. That would mean that these bear ere are capable on a one-way mission of reaching almost any important point in the United States. Those of you who live in the tip of Florida, southern part of Texas, probably have a little more immunity than those living in the other parts of the country. But, by and large, assuming they did not care whether the planes got back or not, they could reach any part of the United States—practically any part of the United States. They have not to the United States and get back to their base. Of course, with refusiing-

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and we must assume that they have the power to refuel--they could reach a good part of the United States and presumbly get back. They could not reach all of the United States; and refueling in a long-range mission of this kind--particularly two-way refueling--presents serious difficulties. One refueling presents not many difficulties, assuming they have the techniques that we have.

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where it comes to mass production, where it comes to the technical skills—right down the line—where it comes to doing what we do in our automobile and our other factories—no, I don't think they can do it, by—cause by and large, taking the Soviet citizen from top to bottom, the lavel of intelligence of the American and of many of the Europeans is higher. The educational standards in the Soviet Union are increasing, and if you can give them a long time, they may reach the proficiency that we

have now reached. I think our great superiority lies in the character and ability of the American citizen from top to bottom, and we should not count very largely on a great technical superiority merely in the scientific field. That was a little aside as I was dealing with the aircraft situation, but I tried to make clear on the bomber situation, one-way mission, they can reach practically any target in the United States. Now, as to whether they can get through our defense, you will hear about that from Gov. Peterson and others, because my problem is looking at the Soviet Union and not looking so much at what we can do in the vay of a counterattack. Whether they would risk their planes on suicide missiems of this kind, whether they would not prefer to wait, if they are going to attack, until they have the long-range bomber that we now believe they are starting in production and may have in a couple of years -- that is question that I cannot answer today. But we are inclined to think the certain of the reasons which would lead them not to attack at the moment would be the fact that they do not have long-range bomber capacity that they could come to the United States and go back and also, as I will come to later, they certainly presumably would desire to increase their stocknile of atomic weapons before they made the attack, if they had the choice, unless they felt they were forced to a situation where they had to attach.

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They have that in mass production, and they have quite a lot of them.

They have a good light bomber, jet bomber, the TU-4 that I mentioned bufore is a prop bomber (propeller). The IL-28 is only available for shorter



Approved For Release 2005/11/28: CIA-RDP80B0.676/R005000030023-5 missions. The force of the Navy lies chiefly in their subsarine force and a certain master of good cruisers. They have no aircraft carrier to the moment, and they only have a few obsolete battleships. They have developed their subsarines and they have developed their cruisers, both light and heavy.

On the atomic side, the President the other day in his speech it the UN gave you the essential facts, and I won't repeat what he haid there. They have had some tests. They have produced is protesting attack atomic books. We believe they have a substantial stockpile of atomic beads of various types. They have weak have respons. They have produced sertain books with thermonuclear reactions, indicating the possibility that the have or will shortly have weapons with a very high amount of explosive power, going into the magnitude.

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choice of weapons, you choose the weapon that you think is most destructive.

We believe that at the present time if they had a choice of parrying so attentive

weapon or a bacteriological or gus warfare weapon, they would choose time

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of chemical warfare.

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I mentioned that in the agricultural field they were having dermined from the conformal particular and they have had to admit that their agricultural literature form have have made really no progress as far as production is consumed from the days before the way of War I.

I said at the beginning that we thought it was unlikely that they would deliberately choose war at this time. One of the reasons for our reaching that conclusion is that they are quite successful with pertain techniques that they are carrying on now--the policy of divide and penstrate. With their phony peace offensive they are trying to divide us. Journal of the phony peace offensive they are trying to divide us.

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effective. They have their apparati abroad and their communist parties in

various countries, particularly in Europe, in France, and in Italy. We

know of the influence they have in various parts of Southeast Anti. They

have other possibilities for meneworing, particularly in the Far East.

The result is that since they have not yet the capacity they would desire

either from the point of view of atomic weapons or aircraft, and because they

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policy we are inclined to think they would choose the latter—that is, to

continue the cold war, rather than to indulge immediately in a ket war

President used in seacheding. There is no reason for either panic or complacency. While we cannot guarantee to you time, we believe that there will be time for planning. But that time should be used. We have to keep in mind that the Soviet has the present capacity to inflict arrious damage, but probably not with the intention of immediately using it. Consequently, we have a duty to be on the alart from now on, particularly in view of the unresolved were in Korea and Indechina which might create at any time political impasses which in the Soviet's view might force them to change their policy. Unless the issues that face us are solved or eased over the coming years, I am afraid we have to look forward to the possibility that our dangers will increase over the ment three to five years as their potentiality both from the point of view of long-range aircraft and atomic books increases. But that is a potentiality, as the President and atomic books increases. But that is a potentiality, as the President and atomic books increases. But that is a potentiality,

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The Honorable Val Peterson Administrator Federal Civil Defense Administration Washington 25, D. C.

### Dear Governor:

I return herewith the corrected transcript of my informal remarks at the recent White House Conference of Mayors, which you sent me with your letter of 28 December last.

It is the general policy in CIA not to give out publicly any of our intelligence appraisals. Normally these are limited in distribution to the policy makers to whom we report.

As a possible alternative if you feel it is important to have a statement covering the general subject matter of my remarks. I would endeavor to prepare a resume, eliminating classified matter, which you might give out as coming from the F.C.D.A.

Faithfully yours.

\$ 74 b Allen W. Dulles Director

### Enclosure

AWD/c

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## FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON 25. D. C.

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

DEC 2 8 19513

Honorable Allen W. Dulles Director, Central Intelligence Agency Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

Attached is the transcript of your remarks to the White House Conference of Mayors (December 14-15).

May we have your edited version of this transcript, or a brief resume if you prefer, for dissemination to mayors attending the Conference, American Municipal Association, U. S. Conference of Mayors, State and local civil defense directors, and public information media.

An early return of this material will be sincerely appreciated.

Val Peterson

Attachment

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GOV. PETERSON: Now, it will be our purpose today and to make perfectly clear to you the foreign situation as the telepaders in our Government see it, to make perfectly clear to you enemy weapons and capabilities, and our joint responsibilities in seeing that America is prepared.

Following each speaker's presentation, a period of time has been allowed for questioning of the speaker. It happens that is true in every case, with just one exception. That ecception happens to be the first speaker on our program this morning, who it is now my privilege to introduce.

decorated for his unusual service with the OSS during the war and is also a diplomat, who on occasions has represented the Whited States on various international commissions. He is a well-known writer and speaker on international affairs and is now Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, which explains why he will be the only speaker who will not be subject to such questions as you may care to direct. I am certain he will be able to handle himself, but it is not appropriate in his case.

### Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Allen Dulles.

MR. DULLES: I have asked Gov. Peterson's permission to reverse him on one point. I am not afraid of questions.

If I can't or shaldn't answer them, I will let you know very frankly. While I only have 20 minutes to address you, I will

try to cut off at least three or four of the minutes at the end so if there are any questions you can put them to me. That be seeing some of you this afternoon at the White House, and we can get together there possibly if there are any more.

The job of the Central Intelligence Agency is to try to ferret out facts and present those facts to the policymaners of Government. It is not our job to say what should be done with the facts. It is merely our job--and that is a hard enough one--to try to find out what the facts are.

when you are dealing with Russia, sometimes the best you can do is to come up with a really uneducated guess, based on inadequate facts, and an estimate of what they have done in the past.

In that connection—and this is not from the point of view of your particular functions as Mayors of our great cities—the Soviets are able to learn a great deal more about can us than we are about them. We publish the essential facts of our situation to the world. We tell the world where our installations are, where we are making this and that. We give them a great deal of information. In fact, I think we give them probably too much, but it is very difficulty. When you have to decide between the maintenance of your freedoms, your freedom of the press and your other freedoms, and possibly disclosing more information when than I would like to see disclose. I can quite understand that maybe our freedoms are much more important. If we start to abridge them in any respect, it is

hard to tell where we will end.

we see it. When Stalin died, early last spring, a change came about in the Soviet Union; but that change, in our opinion, has not affected its policy. It was largely an internal matter. We had not realized—and not until Stalin's death did we realize—the extent to which that old distator had really taken hold of the country and of all the people there and forced it into a pattern that was not a pattern that the other leaders of the Kremlin liked. When Stalin was beried, he was really buried; and one of the extraordinary things is the extent to which they have buried his memory. There has been very little mention of Stalin. The line has been distincted and brought out again; the Stalin has been pretty well interred.

had frozen the Soviet internal policy into a rigid framework—and the framework is still rigid enough. The had set so rigid a framework that the people themselves were beginning to feel impatient. He had frozen their foreign policies into a rigidity that even men like Molotov did not like. They blamed Stalin for the break with Yugoslavia. They probably blamed Stalin pretty largely for the war in Korea and for many other rigid actions in foreign policy. So when he disappeared, they decided to change certain features of their system. That does not mean, as I said before, that they have relaxed to any great extent. They have, however,

in agriculture taken a new look at the situation. They have clamped certain restrictions on the internal police. Beria's dismissal and disappearance is undoubtedly due to the fact that they wanted to curb the secret police. They more or less put a sign up: Don't walk on the grass, but if you walk on the path, we won't worry you so much. In the other days, you never could tell--you might be walking on the grass or walk now on the path and still you find yourself in jail. Now there is more or less a sign: Keep off the grass and we will give you a little more freedom internally than you had before.

their people enough from the point of view of consumer's go wis, and they are making a real effort now to give them make more consumer's goods. One of the interesting things that we have to watch is as to what extent, if at all, that will force them to cut down on their production of munitions and war material. So far we have seen very little sign of that.

They have been using recently quite a little of their gold so buy consumer's goods in the foreign market. Whether that will continue or not, I don't know. You may have seen in the papers reports of sale of Soviet gold. That is going on; and, while this year's sale will not greatly exceed last year's sale, the sale of the last three or four months has gone up quits spectacularly, largely, we think, so they can buy consumer's goods in the market.

We believe that the military now exercise greater authority in the Soviet Union than they did before Stalin's death. It is hard to prove that, but the disgrace of Beris, who was the artisan of putting in political commissars in the Army, is one of the reasons for our belief in that respect.

We sage no signs, however, of a change in their foreign policy as far as objectives are concerned. They are more flexible. Fraternization is on. They are perfectly willing now to mix--where they never would before--with the foreigner. They are trying to give outwardly a more flexible, a nore amenable air; but when it comes to the hard question as to whether they will make any concessions, either in regard to a peace with Germany to unify Germany, as regards a treaty with Austria, or as regards a treaty in Korea, we find no chan e whatever in the fundamental attitude of their negotiators. result is that we see no reason to relax as far as we are con-The policy in fact is more astute and a good leal cleverer because the present policy of the Soviet plays into the neutralist tendencies of many countries of the world, particularly countries like India, countries in Southeast Asia, and to certain people even on the Continent of Europe in France and in Italy.

Soviet intentions: It is our view that the Soviet does not now desire to provoke a hot war. They might stumble into one. They might feel they were crowded into one, but we do not feel, looking over the next six, a eight months, or a year, they were Footeless 2005/11/28:GIA-PDP80B01676R001000030023-5

by surprise attack to initiate, a hot war within that period.

It is hard to predict for a longer period. They are doing will in the cold war. That is one of the reasons. They have prespected for further successes in the Far East. The situation is Indochina is a difficult one. The situation in Korea is a difficult one.

They view it as a situation fraught with possibilities as far as they are concerned.

They desire also to build up their atomic stockpile, and they desire presumably to build up their long-range bomber. If the later and I will speak of that a little later.

The Soviet has, however, such inherent strength the military and other points of view, that it wouldn't be safe for us to let our guards down. Here are some of their elements of strength. They have a great advantage, of course, in having a central position from which they can strike out in various directions, protected by their great land mass, the Sowiet Union, including Siberia, and then flanked by their satellites. One of the reasons for their keeping a tight hold on the satellines is to protect the Soviet heartland. That makes them, as history has shown, in the long run relatively invulnerable to land attack. and presumably therefore only vulnerable to air attack. hase a very large standing Army. Probably the Soviet Army, plus their security troops -- I should say military forces -- Army, Favy, and Air Force--would be around 4.5 million. There is an additional 4 million in China and about half a million in the satellites, making a military force--Army, Navy, Air Force, and

security forces--of around 10 million in the Soviet orbit.

To turnato a point even more interesting from your angle--their Air Force: Total numbers are probably very misleading. They have a long-range bomber force based on the F-29 prototype that they obtained from us and used during the war, probably somewhat improved. We would estimate that they have between 1,000 and 1,500 of these medium bombers, called the TU-4. Their total range stripped down would be somewhat over That would mean that 4.000 miles--4,000 to 4,500/probably. these bombers are capable on a one-way mission of reaching almost any important point in the United States. Those of you who live in the tip of Florida, southern part of Texas, probably have/little more immunity than those living in the other parts of the country. But, by and large, assuming they did not care whether the planes got back or not, they could reach any part of the United States - practically any part of the United States -They have not a heavy bomber at the present time which would have the capacity to get to the United States and get back to their base. Of course, with refueling -- and we must assume that they have the power to refuel--they could reach a good part of the United States and presumably get back. They could not react all of the United States; and refueling in a long-range mission of this kind--particularly two-way refueling--presents serious difficulties. One refueling presents not many difficulties, assuming they have the techniques that we have.

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They have produced in prototype at heast atomic bombs, he believe they have a substantial stockpile of atomic bombs of various types. They may well have weapons. They have produced certain bombs with thermonuclear reactions, indicating the possibility that they have or will shortly have weapons with a amount very high protocycle power, going into the negators.

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I noticed some questions that were submitted by several Approved For Release 2005/11/28: CIA-RDP80B01676R001000030023-5

of the Mayors from California, in which they also raised the question of bacteriological warfare. Our general view on that is this: Where you have a choice of weapons, you choose the weapon that you think is most destructive. We believe that at the present time if they had a choice of carrying an atomic weapon or/bacteriological or gas warfare weapon, they would choose the first--that is, the atomic. We should not, however, let our guards down as to the possible developments both in the bacteriological and in the field of chemical warfare.

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I mentioned that in the agricultural field they were having certain difficulties, and they have had to admit that their agricultural situations has a clared and 1876 REPORT OF THE PROPERTY O

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far as production is concerned from the days before the war.

I said at the beginning that we thought it was unlikely Smel that they would deliberately choose war at this time. One of the reasons for our reaching that conclusion is that they are quite successful with certain techniques that me they are carrying on now -- the policy of divide and penetrate. their phony peace offensive they are trying to divide us. My former boss General Bedell Smith will, tall you more about I just saw him come into the room. In their propagands campaigns they have been extremely effective. They have their apparati abroad and their communist parties in various countries, particularly in Europe, in France, and in Italy. We know of the influence they have in various parts of Southeast Asia. They have other possibilities for maneuvering, particularly in the Far The result is that since they have not yet the capacity they would desire either from the point of view of amomic weapons or aircraft, and because they have still a good deal of maneuverability in the foreign field, in their pelicy w are inclined to think they would choose the letter that It. to continue the cold war, rather than to immediately indulted in a hot war.

consequently, I would just like to take up the words that the President used in concluding. There is no reason for either panic or complacency. While we cannot guarantee to you time, we believe that there will be time for planning.

But that time should be used. We have to keep in mind that

but probably not with the intention of immediately using it.

Consequently, we have a duty to be on the alert from now or,

particularly in view of the unresolved wars in Korea and Indoction,

which might create at any time political impasses which in the

Soviet's view might force them to change their policy. Unless

the issues that face us are solved or eased over the coming

years, I am afraid we have to look forward to the possibility

that our dangers will increase over the next three to five

years as their postentiality both from the point of view or

long-range aircraft and atomic bombs increases. But that

is a potentiality, as the President said, we should face

with calm planning rather than with panic.

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
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MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. DULLES


As I advised you, your speech at the Mayors Conference has been gone over by Grogan. and Kirkpatrick. I have marked with paper clips all of the places wherein you refer to atomic matters. In every instance, however, you refer to Soviet activities in this regard and not the U.S.

16 February 1954 (DATE)

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